the Bali bombing resulted in 62 severely injured patients being evacuated to Royal Darwin Hospital. This paper describes the planning and execution of the Intensive Care Unit disaster plan in the wake of the Bali bombing. There were a total of 20 patients from the Bali blast admitted to the Intensive Care Unit. The disaster operation was successful with all patients admitted, resuscitated, emergency treatment performed and then evacuated to interstate burns units in a timely and efficient manner.
In the late hours of October 12, 2002, several bomb blasts destroyed a nightclub in Kuta on the island of Bali. It will be remembered as the largest disaster resulting from terrorism in Australian history. Kuta is a popular holiday destination for young Australians and the dance floor that night was crowded. The blasts killed more than 180 people and severely injured scores of others. There were more deaths in Bali than in the Okalahoma bombing and more burn injuries than in the World Trade Center disaster on September 11, 2001. Operation Bali Assist was mobilized by the Australian Commonwealth Government, and the Australian Defence Force retrieved injured foreigners from the Indonesian island and brought them to Darwin. The Royal Darwin Hospital (RDH) received 61 casualties over a 12-hour period commencing 24 hours after the blast. This operation was the largest medical evacuation in Defence Force history and the greatest disaster in Australian peacetime history. This paper describes the RDH Intensive Care Unit response to the disaster. The Intensive Care Unit was only one part of the disaster response. The success of this operation would not have been possible without all the teams involved, including Australian Defence Force (ADF) Medical Teams in Bali, RAAF transport personnel, St Johns Ambulance in Darwin, RDH disaster command centre, RDH Emergency Department under the leadership of Dr Didier Palmer, RDH Departments of Surgery, Anaesthesia and Medicine and all RDH employees. It was a team effort involving every craft group in the hospital and a tribute to all that the operation was successful.
RDH Intensive Care Unit
Darwin is the capital city of the Northern Territory. It has a population of more than 100,000 and lies in the tropics at the "Top End" of Northern Australia. The city is closer to Indonesia than it is to any other Australian capital. The residents of Darwin are more likely to go to Bali for holidays than anywhere in Australia. The Top End of the Northern Territory has a population of 150,000 people, in an area of more than 500,000 km 2 with 6,200 km of coastline. Royal Darwin Hospital (RDH) is a 300-bed hospital serving all of the Northern Territory north of Tennant Creek, the eastern Kimberley region of Western Australia, United Nations forces in East Timor and the occasional international retrievals from SE Asia. The RDH Intensive Care Unit is the only tertiary level Intensive Care Unit for more than 2,500 km in any direction. This isolation is unmatched by any other ICU in Australia. There are 500 ICU patients admitted each year and ICU beds open and close to accommodate all admissions from the region. Currently we have a unit physically capable of ventilating 11 patients, but there is a detailed emergency plan allowing us to expand into other spaces to accommodate more patients if required. Our peak occupancy recently has been up to 13 ICU patients occupying beds in ICU and our adjacent Coronary Care Unit (CCU). It is not possible to divert ICU patients to other hospitals. There are the same nursing staff shortages as elsewhere in the country, but peak periods are managed well with staff willing to work through a crisis period. It is on this background that RDH ICU mounted the response to the Bali disaster.
Notification
On the weekend of the October 12-13, RDH held its inaugural Anaesthesia and Intensive Care Continuing Medical Education Meeting at a conference centre in the city. The meeting was well attended by both medical and nursing staff from both departments. On the morning of Sunday October 13 the convener of the meeting, Dr Su Winter informed the key hospital personnel at the conference about the evolving disaster situation. Dr Winter is in the Defence Force Reserves and was the leader of the Darwin Team chosen to go to Bali on the first Hercules. The Director of Anaesthesia, the Director of Intensive Care, many of the Anaesthesia and Intensive Care consultants, the Directors of Nursing for ICU and Operating Theatre and many ICU doctors and nursing staff were present. The initial information was scanty with an estimated more than 100 dead, 20 critically ill, 50 to 60 severely injured and up to 100 patients in total. Most of the injuries were burns and blast injuries. The ICU consultants held an informal meeting and the Director of ICU went to the hospital to activate the ICU disaster plan.
The Decision to Evacuate to Darwin
It was not clear initially how many patients would be evacuated to Darwin. The decision to evacuate all the patients to Darwin was made by the Commonwealth Government in consultation with the Northern Territory Government during Sunday morning and early afternoon. In the process of making this decision, the Divisional Directors of Emergency, Intensive Care and Surgery were asked about capacity and capability to respond to the disaster. The decision was based on the proximity of Darwin to the site of the disaster. The RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force) Hercules would have taken more than 1½ hours to reach the next closest Australian city from Bali. This would have delayed the time to definitive care for the patients by more than 1½ hours and then delayed the turn around of this aircraft by many more hours if required. There were other logistical advantages in Darwin including the short distance from the airport to the hospital (five minutes) and the co-location of the RAAF base and the civilian airport. In the post disaster analysis it was assessed that the shorter time to evacuate to Darwin was life-saving for a number of patients. There is no evidence that the evacuation to Darwin, initial resuscitation and stabilization followed by evacuation to specialist burns units around Australia resulted in any increased morbidity or mortality for the patients. Of the 20 ICU patients, one died in RDH ICU and three died in interstate hospitals in the weeks after the disaster. All of the ward patients survived.
Activation of the Disaster Plan
The Intensive Care Unit disaster subplan provides for the appointment of an ICU Disaster Commander (IDC). This role is assigned to the Director of ICU or the next available most senior ICU consultant. The role of the IDC is to coordinate the ICU disaster subplan, attend command centre briefings, provide information to the command centre and oversee the processing of the patients through the Intensive Care Unit. The IDC does not take on responsibility for the care of individual patients but provides expert opinion if requested and supervision for less experienced doctors during the disaster. The IDC coordinates staffing and ensures staff welfare throughout the disaster. The IDC oversees the communication between ICU, the command centre, external agencies and the community.
The first Hercules was deployed from Sydney and arrived in Darwin to pick up ADF Medical Personnel on the way to Bali at 1500 on October 13. It was estimated that the first casualties would not reach Darwin until late evening.
The long lead-time allowed for systems to be fully in place and additional planning for this specific scenario to occur. The command centre at RDH was set up and the first meeting was held at 1400. At this meeting it was decided to prepare for 20 ICU ventilated patients and to clear the surgical floor (48 beds) to take all the ward patients into one area. An additional area was available if more than 48 beds were required. The hospital was quickly cleared of patients able to be discharged home; surgical floor patients were dispersed to other floors or to the Darwin Private Hospital (DPH) (connected to RDH by a tunnel).
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The disaster subplan for ICU contains details for the expansion of ICU capacity. It was fortunate that the ICU occupancy that morning was one ventilated patient and one patient ready to be discharged to the ward. There were two admissions of ventilated patients to ICU during the lead-time but they were fast tracked to extubation and discharge in the next 12 hours. The routine admissions during a disaster must be considered in any ICU disaster plan.
The average occupancy in ICU is 7.4 patients and the ICU area can accommodate 11 ventilated patients. There are eight wall-mounted monitors and the additional three beds are created using portable monitoring systems. The CCU is a four-bed ward accessed by walking through the ICU. The coronary care patients were moved to a four-bed bay in the renal ward adjacent to the ICU. The portable monitors for the coronary care patients were borrowed from the operating theatres of the DPH. A senior critical care trained nurse was assigned to look after the coronary care patients. The CCU was turned into an additional four ICU ventilated beds. In the existing subplan, further ICU beds are created in the renal ward adjacent to the ICU because of proximity and it has the necessary oxygen and suction outlets. The long lead-time allowed us to alter that plan and utilize the resources of the Darwin Private Hospital (DPH). The Operating Theatre at DPH set up four ventilated beds in their recovery area using anaesthetic equipment and overseen by anaesthetists with many years of experience in intensive care. These beds were not required during the disaster but were essential to the preparation and our commitment to be able to manage 20 ICU patients if required. The DPH recovery area will be part of the subplan for the future. The effective use of co-located private hospital staff, beds and equipment is an important part of a disaster plan. It was also planned to create additional ICU beds in the renal ward and in the RDH recovery area if necessary. The RDH recovery area would have been less than ideal as the operating theatre needed to be fully operational to deal with the disaster related surgical emergencies.
RDH ICU will move into a new 18-bed facility in 2003 with an adjacent nine-bed CCU so in future disasters the critically ill will be managed in the one area even if there are greater numbers of casualties.
Equipment
One of the ICU Consultants was appointed the RDH-DPH Liaison Officer and quickly secured an agreement with the DPH management to borrow any equipment they did not need for their current in-patients. This was not part of the subplan but was an essential liaison in many ways and will be part of the formal disaster plan for the future.
RDH ICU possess twelve ICU ventilators, one old Newport ventilator, two old Sechrist ventilators, and three transport ventilators. There were also three old 7200 ventilators that had not yet been shipped back to the company as trade ins so they were recommissioned to bring the number of ventilators available to 21.
There were portable monitors required for three ICU beds and the four Coronary Care beds that were created in the renal ward. Our local monitoring representative provided spare monitors and the DPH Operating Theatres had four old ECG monitors that were adequate for the CCU patients on the ward. There were also infusion pumps and warming devices borrowed from DPH that proved essential in the resuscitation phase. The disaster did highlight deficiencies in the quality and quantity of available equipment that will be part of a submission following the disaster to improve our disaster readiness. In a remote centre it is necessary to have some redundancies in the health care system to ensure readiness for a disaster.
Staffing
The most difficult task was to plan the staffing. It was not clear when the evacuation would start or how many patients would be received. The ICU nursing staff were notified at 1300 hours to be on standby. All the staff contacted wanted to come in-the hardest task was keeping people away until they were needed. All the ICU and anaesthetic consultants were on standby with the Director of ICU and the RDH-DPH Liaison Officer actually in the hospital preparing the unit. The ICU and anaesthetic registrars and residents were all informed to be ready to come in. A few of the senior medical staff remained at work for most of the next 48 hours-a situation that was less than ideal and will be guarded against in the next disaster. It was difficult to get people to go home to sleep and rest. If a longer response had been necessary the local staffing would have been difficult to sustain. There were many offers of assistance from interstate that would have made a more sustained response possible. In the future a more systematic and authoritarian approach to rostering will ensure the capability for a more sustained local response.
Setting Up
The Emergency Department plan included triaging overflow critically ill patients directly to ICU. There were six ICU bays set up as acute resuscitation bays.
The set up included primed arterial and central line sets, primed IV pump sets and morphine and midazolam infusions. Adrenaline and noradrenaline infusions were prepared. It was arranged with the RDH blood bank to transfer their entire current albumin supplies up to the unit and order more from the Red Cross Blood Bank. The supply of consumables, drugs such as morphine, midazolam, ketamine, antibiotics and tetanus toxoid and IV fluids were increased. The burns trolley was stocked with a share of the supplies available to the Emergency Department, the Surgical Floor, Operating Theatre and ICU. The advantage of being a remote centre is that six weeks of supplies are kept in the hospital at any one time so there are more than adequate stocks to supply for several days of a disaster.
Lead Time Confusion
The Bali medical system was in chaos and communication from the medical teams on the ground became confused by the conflicting information provided by the External Disaster Committee set up at Police Headquarters in Darwin, the Defence Forces and the Commonwealth Government. The numbers of casualties and the expected time of arrival of the first Hercules changed from minute to minute as the day wore on. It became clear that exact details would be unknown until the plane arrived and ICU was set up to manage the highest number of critical patients expected from the varying reports available. The Director of ICU, the Nursing Director and the RDH-DPH Liaison Officer attended Command Centre meetings throughout the preparation phase.
Darwin is in a cyclone area and the city suffered complete devastation in 1974, resulting in disaster planning being high on the hospital agenda. The RDH disaster plan has won national awards and this disaster proved that it works. The hospital functioned at a high degree of effectiveness in all aspects of disaster management, allowing each area to concentrate on its own subplan knowing that other systems would be similarly prepared. The planning and set-up was complete by 1800 hours and the waiting began. The confusion relating to when the first Hercules would arrive meant that precious down time was lost as people remained on high alert throughout the evening. The estimated time of arrival became from 2300 h to 0100 h and staffing was planned concentrating on staggering additional staff between the night and morning shifts.
Admissions to the Intensive Care Unit
The first Hercules from Bali arrived at 0200 hours on October 14 with 14 patients and one victim who had died during the transport. The first three ICU patients were admitted from the Emergency Department between 0300 to 0330. The second Hercules arrived at 0700 hours with 21 patients. There were four patients triaged direct to ICU between 0730 and 0800 hours. One patient was admitted from the surgical floor at 0830. An additional three patients were admitted from Emergency between 1000 and 1030 hours. The third and fourth Hercules arrived around 1200 with 23 patients. One patient was admitted direct to ICU at 1230. One patient was admitted from the Operating Theatre at 1545 and one patient from the surgical floor at 1830. There was one patient admitted to the Emergency Department early Sunday morning who had managed to get on a commercial flight out of Bali and another two small planes with three patients bringing the total to 62 patients triaged through RDH. In 15 hours a total of 14 patients were admitted to ICU. An additional four patients were admitted to ICU on the October 15 from 0030 to 1830 hours. Two further patients were admitted over the next two days. A total of twenty ICU admissions related to the disaster.
Demographics of the ICU Patients
There were 17 males and three females with an average age of 31 (17-58) years. There were 14 Australians and six patients from a range of other countries including one Balinese patient. One international patient died in the ICU and remained unidentified for several weeks. The identities of the other 19 patients were confirmed over the course of the first 12 hours of their admission.
Injuries
Table 1 outlines the injuries and therapies in broad terms. The majority of patients had a combination of blast and burn injuries. Nine of the patients had surgery performed in Bali, including suturing of blast wounds, escharotomies, amputation and laparotomy. Only the injuries requiring immediate treatment were dealt with in Darwin. There were several shrapnel injuries that were treated after the patients were transferred interstate. The major injury for most of the patients was burns and the transfer to a burns unit was a priority in their ongoing management.
Therapies
In the initial response on October 14 the aim was to resuscitate and treat injuries requiring immediate management. All the patients required aggressive fluid resuscitation and received tetanus toxoid and antibiotics. The fluid resuscitation followed the RDH burns protocol of 4 ml/kg per percentage burn area and was monitored and adjusted according to clinical response. All ICU patients had an intra-arterial and a central line inserted either in the Emergency Department or once they arrived in ICU. Three patients arrived intubated from Bali. Two patients were intubated in the ED, four patients were intubated in the OT and the remaining six patients were intubated in the ICU. Five of the six intubations in ICU were difficult intubations with a variety of techniques being used including awake nasal intubation, fibreoptic intubation and three bougie intubations depending on the operator involved. Three patients required continuous venovenous haemofiltration for severe acidosis, rhabdomyolysis and rising potassium levels despite fluid resuscitation. It is interesting to note that despite the intensity of the period, our aggressive enteral nutrition policy was followed with all ventilated patients receiving enteral feeds for at least half the time they spent in ICU.
The ICU bays were each assigned a receiving team of a consultant or registrar and an ICU nurse. This team resuscitated the patient and coordinated their management and investigations. Patients no longer requiring one-on-one medical attention were handed over to the ICU registrar assigned to looking after the stable patients. An ICU consultant performed a complete ward round late in the afternoon of the October 14 to ensure all management plans were completed and patients were in the best possible condition for evacuation. The ICU medical student was invaluable in helping to complete documentation for transfer and providing assistance as requested by the various teams. At no time during the disaster were human or material resources stressed beyond capacity.
Investigation Results
Table 2 summarizes some of the investigative parameters of the 20 patients admitted to ICU. Six patients had a haemoglobin less than 65 g/l. Eight patients had a white cell count less than 4x10 9 /l. Eight patients had a platelet count less than 100x 9 /l. The majority of the patients had hypoalbuminaemia and elevated creatine kinase. Only four patients had a P a O 2 :FiO 2 ratio of less than 200, though 12 patients had facial and airway burns. It was anticipated that lung injury would progress after the patients were evacuated.
Communications
The ICU has three phone lines in the main unit and one phone line in CCU. The RDH plan included diverting phone calls from the public to a dedicated 1800 (free) number. The phone operators did not put calls from relatives through to the unit until the patients in the unit were identified and the caller could be identified. At all times the most important communications issue was patient confidentiality. This policy was a little frustrating for families but proved necessary by the level of media interest with less scrupulous reporters misrepresenting themselves in attempts to obtain detailed patient information. A list of patients' relatives and contact details was compiled and as information became available, the ICU staff contacted them to pass on updates and answer questions where possible. The communication with relatives interstate and overseas was less than ideal. A few episodes of misinformation resulted in added distress to relatives. In future this problem will be solved by diverting all outside calls to one ICU phone and appointing a communications officer in the unit to answer this phone and keep a record of details of calls to and from families. The Evacuation Phase It was evident from the number of patients and the nature of their injuries that the patients needed to be evacuated from Darwin to burns units throughout the country. The Director of ICU was appointed coordinator for the evacuation phase of the disaster. The Royal Adelaide Retrieval Team was in Darwin and help was sought from other retrieval teams around the country. The authorization for the exercise was from the Commonwealth Government and a national teleconference between the Director of ICU and the Health Departments interstate was held on Monday October 14 at 1400 hours to organize and mobilize resources. The ICU patients were retrieved by teams from Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia. The RAAF provided four Hercules aircraft and medical teams to evacuate the ward patients to Perth, Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne (via Adelaide).
The evacuation commenced at 1400 hours on Monday October 14 and the last ICU patient was evacuated at 1200 on Tuesday October 15. The ICU patients were evacuated to Burns Units by matching interstate teams with patients ready to travel based on that team's estimated time of arrival. The first Hercules transport at 2400 h carried two ICU ventilated patients to Perth while all the other ICU patients were transported in small planes dedicated to retrieval. It was not possible to send all patients to their home state but this was done wherever possible. In 24 hours, 14 ICU patients were evacuated. The retrieval teams were all highly professional and efficient. The RAAF evacuated 34 patients from the surgical floor starting at 2300 h on Monday October 14 and was completed in about 10 hours -an operation that was performed with military precision.
Two patients remained in ICU and three patients were admitted to ICU after the initial 24 hours. Three of these five patients were also evacuated to interstate burns units over the next few days.
The Aftermath
A major disaster has lasting effects on the people involved. The staff are affected by the intensity of the work, the nature of the injuries and the suffering and loss experienced by the people they have treated. There was the added dimension that Bali is closer to Darwin than Darwin is to any city in Australia. Terrorism changed from being a problem observed on television to being a reality of life resulting in anxiety and fear.
There were multiple in-house debriefings conducted in each department. The ICU debriefings were led by the ICU consultants and continued on an almost daily basis for several weeks. The one externally led debriefing session was not as useful as the internal debriefings. The external facilitator hindered rather than enhanced the process. Professional counselling was made available but for the ICU staff, talking with colleagues that went through it with you was the single most effective strategy for dealing with the emotional pain in the days to weeks after the event.
Updates on the progress of the patients sent interstate were also extremely important to the staff. In ICU, staff are accustomed to seeing patients through from admission to recovery or death-by sending the patients interstate there was no closure and following their progress became very important.
There was one unidentified male who died in the unit a few short hours after arrival. His identification and contact with his family several weeks after the event was very important to the staff. His injuries were the most severe of the patients evacuated. It was possible to chronicle his last hours for his family and reassure them that he did not suffer-a closure to events that many families of victims of the disaster were denied.
CONCLUSION
The bomb blasts in Bali will echo through the years. The Bali bombing was Australia's largest disaster and greatest tragedy. The role of the RDH ICU was only one part of a successful exercise to bring the injured home to safety and specialist treatment. The long lead-time allowed for meticulous planning that resulted in a smooth operation once the patients began to arrive. The rapid turn around and evacuation of patients to burns units throughout Australia was an excellent example of cross border cooperation. The management of a disaster of this size depends on every team performing their partwe were one team of many teams that successfully managed the worst disaster in Australian history.
